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COMMENTARY-THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CODE REFORM ACT AND NEW SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES
SENATOR EDWARD

M.

KENNEDY*

INTRODUCTION

The problems surrounding the current sentencing process at
the federal, state, and local levels are deeply imbedded in our
criminal justice system. The list of ills reads like a recipe designed
to assure injuctice, unfairness, and uncertainty in society's punishment of the convicted offender. At the federal level, where the
sentence imposed on a convicted offender is usually indeterminate
and subject to parole, the problems of sentencing unfairness are
manifestly evident.' Sentencing disparity is commonplace. 2 One
* United States Senator from Massachusetts. Chairman, Committee on the

Judiciary. B.A., Harvard College, 1954; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1959.
See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER (1973); N.
MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 12-20 (1974); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 14-15 (1976); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS (1975); REPORT ON THE TwENrmrH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976).
For testimony given before the United States Senate regarding the inequities
of the current sentencing process, see Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws: Hearings on S. 1437 Before the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Procedures of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8880 (statement of Norman A.
Carlson), 9018 (statement of Curtis C. Crawford), 9042 (statement of Alan Dershowitz) (1977). Mr. Carlson, who is the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. stated that
the "present code creates many disparities and inequities in the criminal justice
system. It is confusing and frustrating, to both criminal offenders in custody and
the public." Id. at 8880.
One commentator summed up the current sentencing provisions as follows:
"[s]entencing is the one function given to judges on which there is, for all practical
purposes, no law. There is not a hint of what the lawmakers want and no guidance
as to what sentences they think are generally appropriate." Newman, A Better
Way to Sentence Criminals, 63 A.B.A. J. 1562, 1564 (1977).
2 See, e.g., A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDOIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
STUDY, A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974); Seymour, 1972
Sentencing Study for the Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y.S.B. J. 163
(1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. Rc. 6060 (1973); Kramer, Different Judges,Different Justice, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 14, 1975, § A, at 19, col. 3.
In regard to sentencing disparity, one commentator stated that the current
sentencing process operates "in an arbitrary, random, inconsistent, and unspoken
fashion. Factors [such as] . . . guilty pleas, prior record, defendant's age and family circumstances are considered every day by sentencing judges, but in accor-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

offender may receive a sentence of probation, while another, convicted of the very same crime and possessing a similar criminal
history, may be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment.
Sentencing uncertainty has become the rule, caused, in large part,
by the unfettered discretion of federal judges and the United
States Parole Commission.3 Federal law also arbitrarily specifies
the maximum term of imprisonment for each federal offense.
However, these maximums are usually prescribed without consideration of the relative seriousness of the crime as compared to
similar offenses.'
Current law also lacks a full range of effective punishment
options from which the judge may choose.' In too many cases,
dance with uncontrolled and divergent individual views ...

"

Frankel, Lawless-

ness In Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1, 46 (1972).
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1976) wherein the Parole Commission is provided with
the power to "grant or deny an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner .... ;" 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976), which provides a prisoner may be

granted parole by the Commission "upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner .... The
Commission may [also] grant or deny release on parole ... if it determines there
is good cause for so doing .... ;" 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1976), which directs the Com-

mission to consider reports on the potential parolee prepared by the facility in
which the prisoner is confined, along with the prisoner's prior criminal record and
the presentence investigation report. This section further provides for the Commission to consider "such additional relevant information concerning the prisioner...
as may be reasonably available."
For an example of the discretion federal judges possess in relation to sentencing, see FED. R. CaiM. P. 32(c), wherein a judge may forego the use of a
presentence investigation and report where "there is in the record information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing discretion, and the court
explains this finding on the record."
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976) (permitting a maximum 25 year sentence for
"dangerous special offenders"); 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (placing no limitation "on
the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court

. . .

may

. . .

consider for the purpose of

imposing an appropriate sentence").
I For example, there are approximately 130 theft offenses under current law,
with maximum sentences ranging from no imprisonment and a $500 fine, see 18
U.S.C. § 288 (1976), to ten years or imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1976).
1 Indeed, the imposition of alternative sentences appears to be unknown to
current federal criminal law. Existing law speaks in terms of a sentence of imprisonment, the possibility of probation or the exacting of a fine, but there is no lockstep procedure or statutory mandate that such sentences be considered in the alternative by the sentencing judge at the time of the sentencing decision in each
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judges are imposing sentences of imprisonment because they lack
these statutory alternatives. The sentencing judge, confronted
with an archaic criminal fine structure that prohibits imposition
of the type of heavy fine that will be perceived by the criminal as
something more than a minor cost of doing business, is left with
no alternative but imprisonment.' The judge who realizes that a
constructive community service program cannot be imposed as a
condition of probation also opts for sending the defendant to jail.
Such a system is perceived to be unfair, arbitrary, and, perhaps
most importantly, ineffective in making the punishment fit the

crime. Both the community, the victim, and the offender develop
a cynical attitude towards the criminal justice system and its
ability to mete out fair punishment.
I believe that the type of sentencing provisions absent from
current law would be provided by the sentencing reforms of
S. 1722, the Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of 1980, which is
the focal point of this article. 7 My efforts are directed at sentencing reforms at the federal level. This is not to underestimate or
case.
I A dramatic exception is the provision of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976), which permits a fine of $100,000 ($200,000 if the defendant is a recidivist) for the operation
of a continuing drug-trafficking enterprise. Under this section, fines of up to
$300,000 have been imposed on individuals charged in multiple-count indictments.
See United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
962 (1975).
See also NEw YoRK TmEs, March 20, 1973, at 26, col. 1, wherein Judge MacMahon of the Southern District of New York, after imposing the maximum available fines of $75,000 on each of two millionaire defendants found guilty of evading
$761,000 in taxes, stated that he regretted the tax laws did not permit him to
impose a higher fine on each defendant.
7 S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), is much more than a sentencing reform
bill. Rather, it constitutes the most comprehensive and innovative effort yet undertaken by the Congress to draft a completely new federal criminal code. The
scope of this article, however, does not go beyond the important sentencing provisions found in S. 1722. See id. at §§ 2001-2306.
For a more detailed discussion of the criminal code effort, in general, and my
role, in particular, see e.g., Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws: Hearings on S.
1437 and S. 1722 Before The Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Procedures of
the Committee on The Judiciary,91st Cong. - 96th Cong. (1971-1979); Kennedy, A
New Approach to Bail Release: The ProposedFederal Criminal Code and Bail Reform, 49 FoRDHAM L. REV. 423 (1980); Kennedy, Reforming the Federal Criminal
Code: A CongressionalResponse, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1 (1977); Kennedy, Introduction to a Symposium on Criminal Code Reform, 47 GEO. WAsH. L. Rlv. 451 (1979).
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ignore similar problems arising in various states,' but, rather, reflects my own experience and understanding as a United States
Senator. Although this article will stress sentencing reforms involving innovative sentencing alternatives, I do not intentionally
slight the importance of reforming other aspects of the sentencing
process. Indeed, S. 1722 provides comprehensive reform in these
areas as well However, creative sentencing alternatives, involving various avenues other than the one leading to the federal penitentiary, are a striking illustration of how the current correctional
system has failed and where reform is so desperately needed.
THE CURRENT PROBLEM

In discussing the availability of sentencing alternatives under
present law, one must distinguish at the outset between imprisonment and other available options. My criticism concerning the absence of flexibility in the imposition of probation or a criminal
fine is not directed at a sentence of imprisonment. When it comes
to the latter, it is ironic, but true, that current law provides not
an absence of flexibility, but too much flexibility being placed in
the hands of the sentencing judge."0 As already indicated, however, such is not the case when one considers other options. Maximum fines are generally too low to be used as either effective
punishment or as a deterrent." Existing federal probation statutes
suggest few possible probationary conditions and fail to provide
9 Indeed, certain states are light years ahead of the federal government in relation to sentencing reform. See, e.g., CAL.PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 1977) (specifying determinate sentences, allowing pre-imposition credit, requiring court's reasons for choice among three permissible sentences per violation); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-1, -5-3, -8-1 (1973) (the permissible range of sentences for each
offense are classified); OR.REv. STAT. §§ 161.535, .555, .605, .615 (1977) (classification of offenses and permissible sentences of both determinate and indeterminate
nature, depending on offense).
See supra note 7.
10 See FED. R. CRim. P. 32(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 3577
(1976).
" See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
Present federal law suffers from large, inexplicable disparities in fine levels.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (maximum prison term of five years and fine of
up to $10,000) with 18 U.S.C. § 372 (1976) (maximum prison term of six years and
maximum fine of only $5,000).
Also compare 18 U.S.C. § 1426 (1976) (maximum prison term of five years and
a maximum fine of $5,000) with 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1976) (maximum prison term of
five years and a maximum fine of only $2,000).
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wide ranging alternatives to all or part of a prison sentence. 12 Because current federal law limits the imposition of an order of restitution to cases where probation is the sentence,13 restitution may
not be used in conjunction with a sentence of imprisonment or the
imposition of a fine. Nor do the present federal laws provide notification to the victims of crime; notification that may encourage
these victims to seek civil damages against the offender. The law
remains in the dark ages when dealing with the convicted offender
who has served time in prison and is now trying to integrate himself back into society. 4 Finally, the sentencing scheme is conspicuously silent in establishing a statutory procedure for judicial consideration of sentencing alternatives. The present federal criminal
code lacks provisions mandating that the sentencing judge consider all sentencing alternatives that might be imposed in a particular case. 5
When it comes to promoting sentencing reform, therefore,
emphasis must be placed in two distinguishable but interrelated
areas. First, we need substantive sentencing reform to provide additional statutory alternative sentences designed to give the sentencing judge more available options and flexibility in imposing a
sentence to meet the needs of the convicted offender. Second, is
the necessity of procedural reform, guaranteeing that the court
will consider various sentencing alternatives. This reform would
help assure that new substantive sentencing options will be incorporated into federal law and that the court will consider these op11See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976), which authorizes the imposition of probation

"upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best." The maximum term of
probation, including any extension, is five years for any offense.
11Id. This section also provides that as a condition of probation the defendant
"[m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had. .. ."
14Existing civil and employment disabilities imposed on convicted offenders
extend widely throughout federal statutes and regulations. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §
12a(2)(B) (Secretary of Agriculture authorized to deny convicted felons registration as future commission merchants and floor brokers); 12 U.S.C. § 1785(d)
(prohibiting federally insured credit unions from employing, in any capacity whatsoever, any person convicted of an offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust
unless written authorization for the hiring is obtained from the Administrator of
the National Credit Union Administration).
1 Current law is limited to a mere mention of the possibility of suspending the
imposition or execution of sentence and placing the defendant on probation in lieu
thereof. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
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tions in fashioning a fair and effective sentencing decision.
During the past decade, the debate over criminal sentencing
reform has intensified in Congress, in state legislatures, and
among academicians and corrections experts.'" Generally, the battle lines have been drawn between those who advocate liberal use
of imprisonment (with little or no express encouragement of sentencing alternatives) and those who urge that there be a general
presumption against imprisonment, and more innovative and
imaginative alternatives to a sentence of imprisonment.'7 Having been in the forefront of this debate during the past five Congresses, I am convinced that this argument over whether or not
there should be some form of general sentencing presumption is
unnecessary, counterproductive, and ultimately self-defeating. It
has polarized public opinion and has become an obstacle to the
development of more sound and effective proposals.
Advocates of a presumption in favor of imprisonment point
out that excessive use of probation and the imposition of short
prison sentences have failed to provide the needed deterrent to
criminal conduct."8 Because the problem of crime has become a
major concern of the American people, these advocates emphasize
the necessity of providing a more effective deterrent to crime.' 9
They cite th6 need to insure swift and fair punishment of convicted offenders in a time of rapidly rising crime rates. In effect,
they urge the creation of a presumption against the utilization of
probation, especially in cases involving more serious offenses.
They also urge the imposition of mandatory prison sentences in
certain cases.2
. Many of those advocating a presumption against imprisonment concede that effective law enforcement may call for the im'

See note 1 supra.
See generally Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1437

and S. 1722 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. - 96th Cong. (1971-1979).
,1 See e.g., Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1437 Before
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8580 (1977) (statement of Senator Lloyd Bentsen);
Id. at 8995 (statement of Ronald L. Gainer).
"Id.

Id. at 8583 (statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici).
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position of imprisonment in a wide variety of cases.2 1 However,
they make the argument that the correctional system in our nation has largely been a failure in preventing crime and that archaic prisons hardly hold much hope for the rehabilitation of the convicted offender.2 Those who emphasize the non-incarcerative
presumption also support the view that probation also will be
more effective in achieving the rehabilitative purpose of sentencing.2 These advocates acknowledge that imprisonment is obviously the preferred sentence if one is attempting to develop an
effective means of incapacitating the offender. However, these
critics note that when the dialogue shifts away from punishment
and towards the notion of rehabilitation, such as educational opportunity, vocational training, or other correctional programs,
then probation should be considered as preferable to jail.
S. 1722 circumvents this ultimately fruitless debate by establishing a completely new sentencing structure in which general
presumptions are absent. Instead, specific sentencing guidelines
guarantee more individual consideration by the sentencing judge
in each case.Y S. 1722 reflects the prevailing view of the Senate
Judiciary Committee that the wisest course is to avoid general
presumptions either for or against imprisonment and, instead, to
allow a newly created sentencing commission to fashion guidelines
for sentencing. These specific guidelines will be used by the courts
in sentencing the convicted offender with the goal of limiting excessive discretion while allowing the full exercise of informed discretion in tailoring sentences to fit the circumstances of individual
1,Id. at 9123 (statement of Marilyn Kay Harris); Id. at 9079 (statement of
Nancy Crisman).
n Id.

" Id.
See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2003(b) (1979).
Section 2003(b) provides:
[t]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
described in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines
24

and that should result in a sentence different from that described.
Subsection (a)(4) provides:
[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider . . .the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) and

that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced ....
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cases. Thus, the new criminal code bill, while rejecting the notion
of a general sentencing presumption, would, for the first time,
integrate new sentencing alternatives into a new sentencing
scheme.2
Sentencing reform is not a simple matter. True reform requires that a careful balance be struck between the historical need
for individual consideration of the characteristics of both offender
and offense and the desire to promote a more equitable, rational,
and certain approach to sentencing. It is this balance between individual and public interests which S. 1722 attempts to strike.
S.1722 INNOVATIVE

SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES

Summary
S. 1722, The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act of 1980,
would make long overdue reforms in the federal criminal sentencing process.2 8 It is the culmination of a reform effort begun over a

decade ago by the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws,2 and championed in recent years by such experts
Norman Carlson, Dias Marvin E. Frankel, Norval Morris, and
28
rector of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
S. 1722 articulates, for the first time, the philosophical purposes to be served by a sentence: deterrence, incapacitation, punishment, and, to a more limited extent, rehabilitation, and sets
21 Id. at § 2003(a)(3) which requires the judge to consider the kinds of
sentences available. The provision was added by the Committee in its earlier consideration of S. 1437 to guarantee that the judge would consider all types of sentence that might be imposed in a particular case. In addition, the newly created
Sentencing Commission in promulgating its guidelines and the sentencing judge in
imposing a sentence are instructed to fashion a sentence that most appropriately
suits the characteristics of each offense and offender.
26 See S.1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
The principle sentencing provisions are set forth in chapters 20-23. Some of
the important sentencing changes are contained in § 2301, which provides a new
mechanism for the consistent grading of all offenses and in the course of doing so,
generally lowers the maximum terms that can be imposed. In addition, § 2006
provides for new and innovative provisions regarding restitution from the defendant to the victim.
See also § 2201 (increased use of fines); § 2005 (defendant must give notice to
victims of widespread fraud).

" See note 7 supra.
28

See note 1 supra.
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out the factors that a court should consider in exercising its sentencing discretion. 29 The bill creates a United States Sentencing
Commission to develop a system of guidelines and policy statements designed to reduce sentencing disparity and to provide
more rational and determinate sentencing practices."0
Necessary flexibility would be retained, however, by permitting a sentence to be imposed outside of the guidelines in an appropriate case. 3 1 S. 1722 would, however, encourage adherence to
the guidelines by requiring that all sentences imposed outside the
guidelines be accompanied by judicial statements specifically justifying the deviations. 32 In addition, sentences would be subject to
appellate review,3 providing a further check against unreasonable
punishment.
34
S. 1722 also provides for determiriate prison sentences.
Judges would be instructed to sentence defendants to terms that
represent their best estimates, in light of the applicable guidelines, as to how long the offender should actually remain in
prison.3 5 Thus, the bill would eliminate the common judicial practice of imposing inordinately long sentences designed to ensure
that the defendants remain incarcerated for6 at least one third of
3
their sentences, as required by current law.

The bill, therefore, preserves flexibility in sentencing while simultaneously proposing a procedure for the reduction of disparity
through the development of more standardized procedures. In
21See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2003, 2302(a) (1979).
" The father of the Sentencing Commission concept and its most articulate
proponent is Judge Marvin Frankel. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMIAL SENTENCES: LAW
WrrHouT ORDER 118-24 (1973).
22 See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2003(b) (1979).
22 Id. at § 2003(c). A statement of reasons would be required whenever a sentence is imposed, but special detail would be mandated when the sentence falls

outside the guidelines.
Id. at § 3725.
1'This issue has been debated at length. Some preferred to see the indetermi-

note sentence completely struck from S. 1722; others felt that such a step would go
too far. Eventually, complete elimination of indeterminate sentences won out.

See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2302(a) (1979).
6518

U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976) reads as follows: "Whenever confined and serv-

ing a definite term or terms of more than one year, a prisoner shall be eligible for
release on parole after serving one-third of such term or after serving ten years of a
life sentence or of a sentence of over thirty years, except to the extent otherwise
provided by law."

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

most cases, the offender, the victim, and society all will know at
the time of the initial sentencing decision what the prison release
date will be. This increased fairness, and, just as importantly, the
appearance of fairness, should reduce the widespread cynicism
concerning the penal system.
Complementing this new sentencing framework in S. 1722 are
numerous provisions designed to encourage the use of sentencing
alternatives. Maximum fines have generally been substantially increased, with higher maximums provided for corporations and
other organizational offenders than for individuals." Offenders
convicted of a misdemeanor resulting in death would face felony
level maximum fines. Probation will be treated as a sentence for
the first time rather than as a suspension of sentence, which is its
present designation. 8 Numerous probationary conditions are suggested for the first time in.order to encourage judges to use probation rather than imprisonment whenever appropriate." Two inno' See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2201 (1979), which establishes the general statutory authority for the imposition of a fine as a penal sanction. The maximum amount of the fine that may be imposed in a particular case depends: (1) on
whether the offense is classified as a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction; (2)
whether the offender is an individual or an organization; and (3) in the case of a
misdemeanor, whether the offense resulted in the loss of human life. The authorized maximum fines are as follows:
(1) if the defendant is an individual
(A) for a felony, or for a misdemeanor resulting in the loss of
human life, not more than $250,000;
(B) for any other misdemeanor, not more than $25,000; and
(C) for an infraction, not more than $1,000, and
(2) If the defendant is an organization
(A) for a felony, or for a misdemeanor resulting in the loss of
human life, not more than $1,000,000;
(B) for any other misdemeanor, not more than $100,000; and
(C) for an infraction, not more than $10,000.
Compare S. 1722, 96th Cong'., 1st Sess. § 2101 (1979) with 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(1976) (providing for imposition and suspension of sentence as a necessary condition for probation).
Id. at § 2103(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of 19 discretionary conditions
which the court may impose upon the defendant during the term of probation.
Section 2103 (b)(20) expands the discretionary power of the court by providing that
the defendant may be required to "satisfy such other conditions as the court may
impose." Most of the conditions set out in this section have been used with approval in appropriate cases under current law. See, e.g., United States v. Velzaco-Hernandez, 565 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1977) (detention for a period of time in a treatment
facility as a condition of probation); United States v. Wilson, 469 F.2d 368 (2d Cir.
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vative sanctions are also added to the new federal criminal code:
an order of notice to victims of a fraudulent offense"0 and an order
of restitution to victims of a federal crime who have suffered bodily injury, property damage, or some loss resulting from the
offense."
How will these sentencing alternatives work in practice?
S. 1722 permits, as a condition of probation, that nights or weekends be spent in a correctional facility. 2 The bill also encourages
use of community service as a viable alternative to jail in certain
cases. 3 It permits the imposition of probationary conditions which
are designed to prevent the reoccurrence of a specific offense, especially where the offense is job related, 4 and it continues the
current law allowing a court to impose not only a fine, but also an
order of restitution as a condition of probation."
In addition to the creation of these new substantive sentencing alternatives, S. 1722 also provides for the first time a statutory
procedure requiring the sentencing judge to consider all alternative sentencing possibilities." For example, the bill expressly
specifies that an individual offender must either be placed on probation, fined, or imprisoned as provided in those sections of the
bill governing the imposition of such sentences.

7

It further states

that a fine may be imposed in addition to any other sentence. 8
This is also true with regard to criminal forfeiture,49 notice to vic1972) (support dependents and meet family obligations); Bernal-Zazueta v, United
States, 225 F.2d 64 (1955) (no commission of crime during term of probation);
Stone v. United States, 153 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1946) (payment of fine, refrain from
specified employment).
I S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2005 (1979).
"

Id. at § 2006; see note 51 infra.

Id. at § 2103(b)(11).
Id. at § 2103(b)(13).
" Id. at § 2103(b)(6). The condition may be imposed only if the occupation,
business, or profession bears a reasonably direct relationship to the nature of the
offense. The constitutional permissibility of such a condition has been recognized.
See Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
911 (1964).
"1Id. at § 2103(b)(3). Such restitution may be ordered both as a separate sentence and as a condition of probation. See also note 51 infra.
"Id. at § 2003(a)(3). See text accompanying note 25 supra.
'2

Id. at § 2001(b).
"Id.
'7

5. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2004 (1979) provides that a defendant found
S
guilty of a racketeering related offense shall forfeit to the Government any
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tims," and restitution."
Because section 2003(a)(3) requires the sentencing court expressly to consider all alternative sentences," it would for the first
time place the court on notice that a prison sentence need not be
imposed in a case in which equally effective punishment alternatives would serve the same purposes as imprisonment while involving less restraints on liberty. This is not to say that incarceration could not be imposed, as one sentence to be considered by
the judge. Furthermore, nothing in this section requires the judge
to give a priority to nonincarcerative sentences.53 Although
section 2003(a)(3) treats all sentences equally, it reminds judges
that imprisonment alternatives are readily available if appropriate.
This section, coupled with the substantive reforms already
discussed, will promote a more rational, deliberative, and fair sentencing procedure whereby judges would be required to consider
not only the traditional sentence of imprisonment, but other alternatives as well.
Conditions of Probation
S. 1722 specifies.that probation may be imposed as a sentence
in all but three instances: cases involving offenders who have
committed the most heinous crimes," special cases in which the
property:
(1) constituting his interest in the racketeering syndicate or enterprise
involved;
(2) constituting a means by which he has exerted influence over the
racketeering syndicate or enterprise involved;
(3) constituting, or derived from, his proceeds from the racketeering
syndicate or enterprise involved; and
(4) if all of the property constituting, or derived from, the interest,
means, or proceeds described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) cannot be
located or identified, any other property of the defendant to the extent of
the value of such unlocated or unidentified property.
0 Id. at § 2005. The court may order a defendant convicted of an offense involving fraud or other "intentionally deceptive practices" to provide notice and
explanation of the conviction to the victims of the offense.
t Id. at § 2006. In general, restitution may be ordered by the court to compensate the victim for actual expenses or losses resulting from bodily injury or
property damage.
52Id. at § 2003(a)(3). See text accompanying note 25, supra.
5 Id. at § 2003. See text accompanying note 24, supra.
Id. at § 2101(a)(1) (precluding probation for a defendant found guilty of a
class A felony).
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statute specifically precludes probation as an alternative sentence" and, since probation is an alternative to imprisonment,
cases in which a defendant has been sentenced to prison." S. 1722
specifies that the only mandatory condition of probation is that
the defendant not commit another federal, state, or local offense
during his probationary term.-7
In evaluating the new sentencing scheme found in S. 1722, one
should compare it with current federal law. Today the federal
code authorizes the imposition of probation "upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems best." 8 The current code does not
mandate the imposition of any probationary condition but only
lists several specific conditions that may be imposed by the
court." These discretionary conditions are expanded in S. 1722.
Additional conditions are listed for consideration by the court in
individual cases. Thus, for example, the new code permits the
judge to order the defendant to give notice of his conviction to
victims of his offense in accord with the provisions of section
2005.60 This gives the court the power to revoke probation if the
offender fails to comply with this condition. The requirement of
notice, a new substantive provision of S. 1722, becomes an enforcement tool of the court when it takes on the guise of a probationary
condition.6 '
The code also permits the judge to impose, as a probationary
condition, requirements relating to employment, schooling, and
vocational training.2 S. 1722 also includes a probationary condition that an individual defendant refrain from engaging in a specific occupation or profession, but it should be noted that this
condition only applies in those cases where the stated occupation
or profession bears a reasonably direct relationship to the nature
of the offense." Community service is also listed for the first time
" Id. at § 2101(a)(2).
8 Id. at § 2101(a)(3).
',Id. at § 2103(a).

18 U.S.C. 3651 (1976).
"Id. Among the conditions which may be imposed at the discretion of the
court are orders of restitution, fines, support of legal dependents, or participation
in a community treatment center program.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2103(b)(4) (1979). See also note 50 supra.
IId.
82 Id.
13

at § 2103(b)(5).

See note 44 supra.
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as a specific condition of probation."4 This condition encourages
continued experimentation involving community service in appropriate cases.
Whenever a decision is made by the sentencing court to impose probationary conditions, the bill mandates that the condition imposed must be "reasonably related to the factors set forth
in section 2003(a) and (b) and [may] involve only such deprivations of libeity or property as are reasonably necessary for the
purposes indicated in Section 2003(b)." 5 Thus, the court cannot
restrict a defendant's liberty unless such restricted probationary
conditions are deemed necessary in a particular case.
In addition, S. 1722 enhances the power of courts to fashion
effective fines by providing new maximum fine levels that are
more realistic than those found in existing law.6" These increased
fines are. aimed especially at white collar crime. The bill also gives
judges more flexibility in fashioning sentencing options such as
payment of large fines by installments in cases involving offenders
who are simply unable to afford a lump sum fine."
CIVm

DISABILITIES

Any discussion of creative sentencing alternatives must focus
on the new provisions of S.1722 which, for the first time, limit the
current tendency to impose civil disabilities on the convicted offender. All too often the offender who has served time in jail and
has been released finds that his conviction acts as a bar to obtaining employment or exercising other civil rights. 6 Such a bar
inhibits reintegration of the offender back into society and undercuts whatever rehabilitation may have been effective while the offender was in prison. In a very real .sense, the imposition of civil
disabilities on those convicted of crime is ultimately self-defeating
from society's point of view as well as the defendant's.
S. 1722 would change all of this. It would for the first time
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2103(b)(13) (1979).
Id.*at § 2103(b).
u See note 39 supra, and accompanying text.
Id. at § 2202(c). It should be noted further that the court retains jurisdic-

tion over the sentences of a fine and may modify or remit the sentence upon petition by the defendant. For the purposes of appeal, the sentence of a fine constitutes a final judgment. Id. at § 2202(b).
" See note 14 supra.
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place a general restriction on the imposition of civil disabilities
under color of federal law. 9 In regard to employment, the new
code goes even further, prohibiting employment disabilities arising out of a federal conviction whether the employment sought is
at the federal, state or local level."0 The new code provides that,
although certain civil disabilities still may be imposed in particular cases, there is a heavy burden against the imposition of such
disabilities.7' The code emphasizes that they may not be applied
without specific justification and that a reasonable relationship
must exist between the disability and the offense for which the
72

offender was convicted.

CONCLUSION

The inequities and
ing practices constitute
tice system. Correcting
veloping new statutory

arbitrariness of current criminal sentencmajor flaws in the existing criminal justhe capriciousness of sentencing and desentencing alternatives are not panaceas

for all of the problems which today confront the administration of
criminal justice at the federal, state, and local levels. The system
continues to strain under the weight of overloaded courts, archaic
prisons, and outdated and confusing criminal codes.
However, S. 1722 meets the critical challenge of comprehen*DS. 1722, 96th Cong., lst Sess. § 4031 (1979) provides that an imposition of
civil disabilities will be allowed only if:
(a) the offense occurred in connection with the particular right, privilege, or opportunity withheld by reason of that disability; or
(b) there is a substantial probability, in light of the offense and other
relevant circumstances, that the person so convicted will abuse the right,
privilege, or opportunity withheld by reason of that disability.
70 Id. at § 4032(a).
T'Id. Denial of employment or of a professional or occupational license will be
countenanced only if:
(1) there is a reasonable relationship between the conduct constituting
the offense and the employment, and the appropriateness of considering
the relationship has not been mitigated by the passage of time; or
(2) there are other circumstances that, in combination with the conduct constituting the offense, suggest convincingly that the person is unsuitable to engage in the employment, or that others may be more
suitable.
72 Id. at § 4032(b) provides that a denial of employment or access to employment must be accompanied with a statement to the applicant of the reasons for
the denial.
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sive sentencing reform. The bill's provisions are designed to curb
judicial sentencing discretion, eliminate the indeterminate
sentences, phase out parole release, and make criminal sentencing
fairer and more certain. S. 1722 provides, for the first time, a system of creative, alternative sentencing; along with a ready-made
blueprint for judges to follow which enhances the use of the
criminal fine and probation and encourages the innovative use of
restitution, forfeiture, and notice to victims. This current reform
effort constitutes the most important attempt in two hundred
years to fashion a truly effective sentencing scheme.
Our agenda remains a large one in this area. An enormous
challenge confronts us in determining the appropriate sentence to
be imposed on the convicted offender. We must no longer think in
terms of simplistic solutions. We must replace the unacceptable,
present sentencing law with more practical and workable alternatives. S. 1722 elevates the quality of debate surrounding the central issue of sentencing in our society and sets new standards by
which to judge future efforts. The healthy debate surrounding
S. 1722 will go a long way to assure a final product that constitutes
a major reform in the punishment of the convicted offender.
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